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DELAYER PAYS PRINCIPLE
EXAMINING CONGESTION PRICING WITH COMPENSATION*
David Levinson · Peter Rafferty**
Abstract: Despite its virtues, congestion pricing has yet to be widely adopted. This paper
explores the issues of equity and use of toll revenue and several possible alternatives. The
equity and eﬃciency problems of conventional (uncompensated) congestion pricing are
outlined. Then, several alternatives are discussed and developed. A new compensation
mechanism is developed, called the delayer pays principle. This principle ensures that those
who are cause delay to others pay a toll to compensate those who are delayed. We evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of this idea by simulating alternative tolling approaches and evaluating
the results across several measures, including delay, social cost, consumer surplus, and
equity. Diﬀerent tolling approaches can satisfy widely varying policy objectives, thus this
principle is applicable in diverse situations. Such a system is viable and can eliminate some
common hurdles of congestion pricing while remaining revenue neutral.
Introduction
Congestion pricing continues to face barriers to adoption, yet the basic
theory is uncomplicated. Vickrey (1969) introduced a simple bottleneck
model that illustrated how pricing at a roadway bottleneck is an eﬀective
way to eliminate delay. He showed that tolls charged to drivers could
spread the demand evenly through the rush period to reduce or eliminate
delay, while maintaining the same throughput at the bottleneck. The
model has been extended in a number of papers, including (Arnott et al.
1993, 1998).
While traﬃc is very light, little interaction occurs between vehicles and
no congestion externality aﬀects the cost of a trip. When traﬃc is heavier
and an additional vehicle imposes added delay on other drivers, the mar-
ginal cost of a trip is greater than the average cost. Because drivers base their
decision to make a trip on perceived average cost, the untolled equilibrium
occurs at a greater traﬃc volume than if the decisions were based on the
marginal cost. A goal of congestion pricing is to adjust the personal cost
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of a trip in congested conditions such that equilibrium occurs at the lower
volume where the marginal cost curve intersects the demand curve. This
increased cost internalizes the congestion externality.
Many second-best variations of this basic congestion pricing idea have
been proposed – and some implemented – that hope to improve economic
eﬃciency, given practical considerations. Braid (1996) and Verhoef et al.
(1996) both explored situations with untolled alternative routes. Others
have proposed rationing or reservation pricing as second-best solutions,
and several metropolitan areas have implemented variations. Fielding and
Klien (1993) advocated High Occupancy Toll (HOT) Lanes, which now
operate in several United States cities. Daganzo and Garcia (2000) devel-
oped a scheme that combines rationing and reservation pricing for the
bottleneck model. They showed that this second-best solution could reduce
user cost while improving Pareto eﬃciency. As is common in congestion
pricing writing, their paper concludes by listing several practical and tech-
nical questions that need answering.
These questions typically wonder at what to do with cheaters and
uninstrumented vehicles; how will alternate untolled routes come into
play; what are the equity implications – both for the rich vs. poor users,
and for the areas in a metropolitan region with and without toll roads; and
how should the tolling authority use the revenue? One possibility for using
the revenue is compensating the delayed. This paper investigates the issue
of compensation and several possible alternatives. First, the equity and
eﬃciency problem of conventional (uncompensated) congestion pricing is
outlined. Next, a new compensation mechanism is suggested, called the
delayer pays principle. These alternatives are in contrast with the eﬃciency
arguments put forward about marginal cost pricing presented in most
research on the subject.
Within the development of the delayer pays principle, we explicitly
quantify the full marginal cost of travel delay. The delay externality caused
to other users may persist beyond the time a given vehicle is present in a
queue. Properly pricing this is crucial for eﬃcient and equitable tolling. In
the delayer pays approach there is a transfer of resources, not just a
collection of revenue. This approach is also diﬀerent from those that oﬀer
reduced tolls, vouchers, or other compensation because the two-part dy-
namic toll is directly linked to the congestion externality and marginal costs.
Drivers will pay the price that corresponds to the full marginal cost (delay
caused to others), but they will also collect the corresponding compensa-
tion for the delay they experience, which would not exist but for  Levinson
& Raﬀerty 3 the presence of others. In this approach, it is feasible for the
tolling authority to act only as a transfer agent and collect no net revenue.297 Delayer pays principle
Presented last is a further exploration of delayer pays pricing in a broader
scope. We evaluate the eﬀectiveness of this idea by simulating many
diﬀerent tolling approaches and evaluating the results across several meas-
ures. Issues of modeling, equilibrium, and policy are discussed along the
way. This eﬀort oﬀers solutions to varied policy objectives and brings us
closer to practical implementation of congestion pricing.
Delayer pays principle
Consider a driver choosing whether to depart early and reach the bottle-
neck early in the queue or to depart home later and pass through the
bottleneck toward the end of the queue period. The delay and the entire
travel cost to the driver could be the same in either case, but the marginal
cost is very diﬀerent. In the ﬁrst case, the driver imposes an incremental
delay on every driver to arrive behind her during the queue period. In the
second case, only the small number of drivers to arrive after her at the end
of the queue will face the additional delay. A vehicle’s presence earlier in
the queue may have a much longer reverberation. The full marginal cost
of a vehicle depends on how many other vehicles there are and when each
vehicle arrives.
Charging the full marginal cost and paying people proportional to their
delay would produce the result shown in Figure 1. This ﬁgure is a decom-
posed queuing diagram, and it illustrates a simple example of nine vehicles
arriving in nine seconds, thus forming a queue which then dissipates.
Vehicle one arrives and then departs as vehicle two arrives. Vehicle three
is delayed by vehicle two and delays vehicles four and ﬁve. By the time
vehicle ﬁve passes the queue, vehicle nine is already waiting, and so on. This
representation also illustrates that more money is paid in than paid out. The
discrepancy is because eliminating a vehicle will sharply reduce delay, but
to the delayed vehicle, it matters not which vehicle ahead is eliminated, any
one of them will reduce delay. With congested facilities, additional vehicles
raise the average travel cost for everybody – thus the marginal cost always
exceeds average cost. So using the full marginal cost accounting will
generate surpluses. This can be described mathematically with the equa-
tions and description given in Table  1. The incomplete marginal cost
corresponds to the queue at the time a vehicle departs the queue; the full
marginal cost also accounts for the vehicles arriving in the queue after this
time. The reimbursement income corresponds to the delay caused to a
vehicle by others before it.
If people vary in their values of time, people with a high value of time
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get more dollars back than the value of the time they lost. This may induce
more travel by clever people with low values of time trying to swindle the
system. Without a base toll in place, a person arriving at the end of a
queuing period is delayed more than they delay others and could receive
a net compensation. However, a nominal base toll eliminates this possibil-
ity while funding administration, operation, and maintenance costs.
Table 1. Mathematical Model of Delayer Pays Compensation Approaches.
Cost and Income Variables Expression
Sv = Own cost Sv = Av – Dv
T[ ] = Total cost [for arrival pattern
containing vehicles in bracket] [ ] [ ] ‡”= v S T
Jv = Incomplete marginal cost Jv = Q(Dv) – 1
Mv = Full marginal cost Mv = T[1—V]  – T[1 — v-1,v+1 — V] – Sv
Rv = Reimbursement income Rv = Sv/µ
Nv = Net income Incomplete marginal cost
Nv = Jv – Rv Full marginal cost
Nv = Mv – Rv
Notes: Subscript v denotes vehicle v. Av = Arrival time (at back of queue). Dv = Departure
time (from front of queue). Q(t) = Number of vehicles in queue at time ‘t’. µ = Service
time (headway between vehicles departing queue).
Fig. 1. Average and Marginal Eﬀects of Delayer Pays Principle.299 Delayer pays principle
Moreover, the system would send price signals back to drivers, who
would then adjust their departure times in some fashion, thus smoothing
out the demand. A new, less peaked, arrival pattern would result. There-
fore, after equilibration between price and demand, the system would have
a lower price and lower net turnover.
Strictly speaking, the correct charge is unknown until some time after the
driver exits (the front) of the queue, but some approximations could be
made. The charge depends not only on how many vehicles were behind
the driver at the time the driver exits, but also on how many vehicles are
behind those vehicles – that is on how much delay that vehicle actually
caused. We can post the expected price on a variable message sign just
before the bottleneck. This will not be strictly accurate, as the mainline ﬂow
may suddenly spike upward, or the oﬀ-ramp may suddenly get more traﬃc.
Nevertheless, with experience, the forecasting system would become in-
creasingly reliable.
The delayer pays approach is a straight-forward solution to “what to do
with congestion pricing revenue” – return it directly to those who were
delayed almost instantly. The system can be perfectly revenue neutral, stay
within the roadway sector, and be economically eﬃcient. Overall, the
amount of revenue collected could equal the amount distributed. Howev-
er, those who delay others the most pay the most, while those who are
delayed more than they imposed delay on others are compensated for their
delay.
Policy Objectives and Measures of Eﬀectiveness
Deﬁning an objective function can be a complicated task. Nonetheless, we
wish to explore the feasibility of this type of tolling approach, so we have
identiﬁed seven measures of eﬀectiveness.
1. Total Delay is the ﬁrst measure. This is the total queuing time at the
bottleneck for all vehicles. It is the area between the arrival and departure
curves on a standard queuing diagram. This value should be no greater than
the untolled condition.
2. Schedule Delay is the sum of all early and late arrival penalties arising
from drivers missing their desired arrival time. A value of time is assigned
to convert this measure to dollars.
3. Total Toll is the net toll from the user’s perspective. If this value is zero,
then the tolling authority has no net gain, but they do if this is positive. A
certain criterion is that this value must be greater than zero, or the tolling
authority loses money. While net payment to drivers may reduce delay,300 David Levinson · Peter Raﬀerty
it is an unlikely policy decision. The application of a base or constant toll
can ensure that no driver can proﬁt.
4. User Cost is the dollar sum of the ﬁrst three items: total delay, schedule
delay, and total toll. Another objective may be to improve this value,
though if it is unchanged, other measures may still improve.
5. Social Cost considers tolls – both positive and negative – as purely
transfers between agents within the system. Therefore, the social cost is the
sum of only the total delay and the schedule delay. This is a key value to
minimize because it represents economic ineﬃciency arising from conges-
tion externalities.
6. Equity among users is measured by the Gini coeﬃcient associated with
a Lorenz curve. This measure is not about the spatial equity problem in
a metropolitan area when tolls are applied to an isolated road; that is a
broader policy issue and is not addressed here. A Lorenz curve is developed
which represents how the share of the cost is spread among the population.
The Gini coeﬃcient is a measure of the deviation from perfect equity. A
coeﬃcient equal to one is perfect inequity (one person is paying for all);
a coeﬃcient of zero is perfect equity.
7. Consumer Surplus is the seventh measure. This is estimated by eval-
uating the logarithm of the denominator in the choice equation (deﬁned




= ∑ ln expc h
1
12
where CSk is the consumer surplus for tolling approach k, j indicates the
ﬁrst through twelfth time intervals for the given day, and U is the utility
of the trip for the time period. This value is also known as the log-sum (8).
Another consideration is how closely the tolls compare to the theoretical
marginal cost pricing. How closely does the positive toll pattern matches
the theoretical right triangle shape; how much is each group paying for the
delay caused; and how much are they reimbursed for delay suﬀered?
The possible combinations of these measures into an objective function
are limitless. Only a few are discussed here, but other objectives are equally
suitable.
Delayer pays model
The delayer pays model is based on the bottleneck framework. A number
of motorists desire to pass a bottleneck at a certain time during the morning301 Delayer pays principle
commute. Departure time decisions are modeled with a multinomial logit
model with a random utility component. Values of time are assumed the
same for all travelers.
Figure 2 illustrates a characteristic queuing diagram for a large number
of vehicles. Time is measured on the horizontal axis, number of vehicles
on the vertical axis. The slope of the arrival curve (the upper curve)
represents the rate at which vehicles are arriving at a bottleneck; two
diﬀerent arrival rates are shown in this ﬁgure. The slope of the departure
curve (the lower curve) is the rate at which the facility serves traﬃc. The
departure curve is the same as the arrival curve unless arrivals exceed
capacity or a queue is already present. The space between the two lines
represents the delay in a queue. The vertical distance between the arrival
and departure curves at any time is the number of vehicles in the queue.
The horizontal distance is the time spent in the queue by any vehicle. This
is a standard representation of traﬃc ﬂow at a bottleneck.
In the absence of vehicle n, every vehicle arriving after it saves the time
that vehicle n took to pass the bottleneck. Assuming a single-lane bottle-
neck with a capacity of 1800 vehicles per hour, the service time per vehicle
is two seconds. The heavy line along the arrival curve in the ﬁgure repre-
sents the delay externality caused by vehicle n. The height of this line – the
number of vehicles from n to the last queued vehicle – multiplied by two
seconds is the toll that ought to be charged. The determination of this value
extends in time beyond td, the time that vehicle n departs the queue. The
heavy horizontal line represents the delay experienced by vehicle n, caused
Fig. 2. General Queuing Diagram.302 David Levinson · Peter Raﬀerty
in part by each vehicle arriving before vehicle n. Therefore, the heavy
horizontal line represents the reimbursement to vehicle n.
This approach raises important questions. The shape of the full marginal
cost toll in time is of chief concern in practice. As in Figure 1, this toll jumps
from zero to its maximum value for the ﬁrst vehicle in the queue, and then
reduces again to zero over the duration of the queue. The implication, of
course, is that for a very heavily traveled facility the ﬁrst driver in the queue
would be charged a lot of money to pay for the holdup caused to the
possibly thousands of vehicles to come after. Can (or should) this be
rectiﬁed to enable implementation? Another question is whether welfare
gain can be realized with zero net revenue for the tolling agency. Tolls are
collected for the delay caused, but the money is allowed to be returned in
part, in full, or even in excess, for the delay experienced. The tolling agency
may act only as a transaction manager for the delayers paying the delayed.
Methodology
This investigation uses a hypothetical bottleneck section to represent a
capacity constraint. The number of lanes approaching the bottleneck is two
or more lanes, but the departure from the bottleneck is just one lane. The
service time assumption is two seconds per vehicle, corresponding to a
typical maximum throughput of 1800 vehicles per hour per lane.
During a morning commute, 1200 vehicles ideally wish to pass this
bottleneck at 8:00 AM, and they wish to do so with minimal delay. A driver
passing earlier than this would arrive at work earlier than necessary and
would be foregoing time that could have been spent at home or doing
something they feel is a better use of their time. A driver passing the
bottleneck later than 8:00 AM will arrive at work later than desired and
must deal with the associated penalties. Not only are they late for work and
have lost that time, but also they may have to make up that time later.
These early and late penalties are also referred to as schedule delay.
The entire cost, or disutility, of a trip for each user comprises six compo-
nents: (1) early arrival penalty, (2) late arrival penalty, (3) delay penalty, (4)
positive toll, (5) negative toll, and (6) base toll. For ease of interpretation,
values of time among all drivers are the same. A typical value of time for
motorists, commonly used in beneﬁt-cost accounting for example, is 9 dollars
per hour, corresponding to the 15 cents per minute used in this model.
The early arrival penalty decreases linearly with the time the vehicle
passes the bottleneck as time approaches 8:00 AM; it is zero otherwise. The
tradeoﬀ assumed for this time is 10 cents per minute, which reﬂects the
diﬀerent values of time at home and time spent at the oﬃce early. The late303 Delayer pays principle
arrival penalty increases linearly with the time the vehicle passes the
bottleneck after 8:00 AM, and is zero if they pass before then. Arriving late
has a cost of 20 cents per minute.
The extra time the trip takes due to congestion is the delay component.
In this model, the delay occurs at the bottleneck – in real networks the
principle in unchanged, but the situation is more complicated. The value
of extra in-vehicle time is the same as the value of time, 15 cents per minute.
The travel time and operating costs for the entire trip in the absence of
congestion are not included in this model because they are an underlying
ﬁxed cost the user has chosen on a long-term basis by the location of their
residence and employment.
The positive toll is the full marginal cost of congestion caused to others.
This is calculated as the total delay that would be eliminated by the absence
of the vehicle. As before, the cost of delay is 15 cents per minute. The
negative toll reimburses drivers for the delay they experience. The objec-
tive of this tolling approach is not to generate revenue for the tolling
agency, but to internalize the external costs of congestion. Our hope for
this compensation aspect is that it has public and political appeal. One pays
for the congestion caused to others, and one is paid for the congestion
suﬀered from others. Drivers will not be paid so much as to attract
proﬁteers, for the cost of time and operating a vehicle outweighs the
negative toll remuneration. A base toll can also oﬀset this potentiality. In
this model, the negative toll is set at 15 cents per minute.
The implications of the positive and negative tolls are best illustrated by
considering the ﬁrst and last vehicles arriving in a queue. The ﬁrst vehicle
experiences no delay but causes some small delay to every vehicle queuing
from that point until the dissipation of the queue, which again obviously
occurs after the given vehicle has departed from the bottleneck. If a separate
toll were applied to every vehicle, then this vehicle would be paying the
maximum toll.
Vehicles arriving near the time of queue dissipation will not cause much
delay, and therefore have a very small positive toll, but still collect the
negative tolls for the time they are delayed. This results in a net money ﬂow
to this vehicle. As mentioned before, tangible income is unlikely. A base
toll should only be set high enough to ensure that net tolling is greater than
zero. Regardless of its value, it represents another ﬁxed cost so does not
aﬀect time interval choice and demand patterns.
Driver Time Interval Choice
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perceived disutility for traveling at that time. Rather than determine the
utility for each of the 1200 vehicles, a utility is calculated and averaged for
each ﬁve-minute period surrounding the ideal passage time of 8:00 AM. For
this investigation, 12 possible 5-minute time slots are presented to the
drivers, from 7:20 AM to 8:20 AM. The 12 periods provide a wide range
of utilities, and the ﬁve-minute increments are small enough to provide an
approximation of a continuum, but large enough to encompass many
vehicles and ease computation. In reality, one cannot expect drivers to
gauge their arrival time much more precisely than a ﬁve-minute window.
In addition, the ﬁve-minute period matches a typical data collection time
increment on freeways and could be the time increment used in practical
congestion pricing applications. The beginning and ending times were
established such that the utilities associated with travel at those times are
approximately equal. At the beginning and end of the peak hour only the
early and late arrival penalties are usually in eﬀect.
How many drivers choose each of the 5-minute periods is determined
through a random utility multinomial logit choice model. The underlying
utility expression is:
Ui =-( E*tei + L*tli + D*tdi + Pi – Ni) i = 1,…,12
where,
Ui is the utility for time interval i
E is the cost/minute of passing the bottleneck early
tei is the average time before 8:00 AM that group i passes the bottleneck (minutes)
L is the cost per minute of passing the bottleneck late
tli is the average time after 8:00 AM that group i passes the bottleneck (minutes)
D is the cost per minute of delay
tdi is the average time spent in the queue for group i (minutes)
Pi is the positive toll for group i
Ni is the negative toll (reimbursement) for group i
A term for a ﬁxed base toll is not shown here. The number of vehicles























where V is the number of vehicles, i represents the time interval (one
through twelve) in question, j indicates the ﬁrst through twelfth time305 Delayer pays principle
intervals for the given day, and C is the cost of the trip for the time period.
The solutions to this arise through an iterative process. Drivers will make
their decisions based on the 12 choices presented to them. The utility of
these 12 choices in turn depends on the decisions of the drivers and the
resulting delay. Therefore, the drivers choose their arrival time based on
“yesterday’s” results. Each component of the cost is averaged over all
vehicles in the 5-minute interval, and the sum is the information presented
to the decision makers on subsequent days.
The headways within each 5-minute interval are assumed constant. If the
average headway is less than two seconds, a queue forms. This occurs if
more than 150 of the 1200 vehicles choose any interval.
Positive Tolling Approaches
Many positive tolling approaches were tested and evaluated, and the the-
oretical triangle shape shown in Figure 1 remains a subset of these alter-
natives. Figure 3 illustrates the possibilities. The simplicity of the rectilinear
shape allows for deﬁnition by just four parameters. Certainly, an optimi-
zation routine could sort through independent tolls among all intervals, but
such a resulting scheme would be diﬃcult to implement in the ﬁeld and
confusing for drivers. The only constraint on the shape is a < x < b. We
allow the position of a to vary among the ﬁrst eleven time intervals. In the
ﬁgure, a is in position 3, and x is in position 6, and b is in position 11. Lastly,
the peak toll is controlled by the parameter y. For this exercise, this
parameter varies from $0.00 (a no-toll condition) to $2.40 in eight $0.30
steps. In the ﬁgure, y is in position 5, or $1.50. The tolls in the intervals
before and after this peak toll are linear interpolations based on the four
parameters. In Figure 3, {a,b,x,y} = {3,11,6,5}. There are 1,848 possible
tolling approaches to evaluate using a variant of a grid search optimization.
The toll free condition remains the baseline for comparison.
Evaluation of tolling approaches
With no tolling, the vehicles assume an expected arrival pattern. A queue
is present from 7:45 to about 8:10, and the total delay is 52.0 hours. The
cost of the trips in the early and very late periods is controlled solely by
the schedule delay.
It is because of the conﬂicting goals that we developed 1,848 trials of all
triangular shapes and sizes of positive tolling approaches to compare to the
untolled condition. However, it is cumbersome to visualize the relationship
between the seven measures of eﬀectiveness at the same time. It is much306 David Levinson · Peter Raﬀerty
easier to plot the results for each of the 21 possible pairs of measures to see
where the untolled condition lies. As much as each relationship warrants
at least a paragraph of discussion, just two are reproduced here.
In Figures 4 and 5, the unique mark represents the untolled condition.
The “tails” are those alternatives with a very small positive toll, but with
the negative toll in full eﬀect. Travelers in these cases pay little but are
reimbursed for their time in the queue. In each ﬁgure, there are many
points showing that the two axis measures can be improved over the
untolled condition simultaneously. In Figure 5, any tolling scheme repre-
sented by a point below and left of the mark improves both total user cost
and total delay.
Are there any scenarios such that all seven measures are improved? The
answer is yes, but only two. Figure 6 illustrates the positive toll patterns
for these two scenarios. Note that they are both of the form of the
theoretical marginal cost triangle. In addition to improving the seven
measures discussed, each of these scenarios improves the utility for all but
about 8% of drivers. These solutions are therefore nearly Pareto improving
strategies; and those 8% that are worse oﬀ face only a ﬁve-cent increase
in their total trip cost.
Alternatively, an agency can easily select a tolling scheme that best suits
their policy objectives.
There exists a tolling scheme that eﬀectively eliminates delay. While
reducing delay is a good thing, this scenario sacriﬁces user cost, schedule
delay, and consumer surplus. Maximizing equity, or minimizing the Gini
coeﬃcient, may be another policy objective. However, the scheme that
maximizes equity also has a very high user cost. A third objective may be
Fig. 3. Positive Toll Alternatives.307 Delayer pays principle
to reduce social cost. Unfortunately, the scheme that does that best has a
very high user cost and the queue is split into two – one before the peak
toll and one after. Regarding consumer surplus, the best way to maximize
this is to not charge a positive toll while continuing to reimburse motorists
for their delay – the “tails” in Figures 4 and 5 – very expensive for an agency.
These single measure objectives are unlikely policies, but they do illus-
trate the tradeoﬀs among the conﬂicting objectives. As shown earlier, two
scenarios do improve all seven measures, but there remain inﬁnite middle-
ground scenarios. Figure 6 also shows two more possibilities.
The ﬁrst alternative satisﬁes the objective of maximizing social welfare
– or minimizing social cost – while ensuring that user cost does not worsen
and that the total toll is positive. If a base toll is not included, 15 scenarios
Levinson & Raﬀerty 10 satisfy these criteria. With a $0.25 base toll, that
number rises to 30. This improves social welfare by about 12% and reduces
delay by about 40%. The other measures for this solution are all within 5%
of the untolled condition.
The last scheme minimizes delay and maximizes social welfare, with
similar constraints. This solution yields a 53% delay reduction, an 11%
social cost reduction, a 19% Gini coeﬃcient improvement, and a 16%
increase in consumer surplus. Schedule delay and user cost are nearly
unchanged (within 1%) from the untolled condition, and the tolling author-
Fig. 4. Social Cost vs. Total Toll.308 David Levinson · Peter Raﬀerty
ity collects a small net revenue. This second-best solution is very promising
because it shows that a simple tolling scheme – with compensation – can
improve both eﬃciency and equity.
Conclusions
Equity and eﬃciency form the two pillars on which transportation deci-
sions should be made. However, determining what is eﬃcient, much less
what is equitable, is far from simple. Who owns the right to travel on the
roadway? Currently the system is ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-serve. Unfortunately the
conventional marginal cost pricing approach often ignores traﬃc dynamics
and tends to treat time in discrete blocks rather than continuously. How
signiﬁcant a problem this is depends on the conditions of the case. The
delayer pays scheme outlined in this paper implies everyone has a right to
free-ﬂow, and the individuals who deny that right to others are the ones
who should pay. So is delayer pays a good idea? This depends on answers
to two questions:
• Empirical question - What will be the magnitude of cheating/gaming the system?
• Technical question - What is the cost of the added data collection and toll redistribution?
Traﬃc manifests high transaction costs, no property rights, and little bar-
gaining, perhaps explaining the lack of eﬃcient outcomes. Electronic tolling
Fig. 5. User Cost vs. Delay.309 Delayer pays principle
Fig. 6. Alternative Tolling Approaches.
obviates transaction costs, and we can consider at least two extreme
alternatives regarding the initial distribution of rights:
• Everyone has the right to free (unpriced) travel.
• Everyone has the right to freeﬂow (undelayed) travel.
If everyone has the right to free (no monetary cost) travel, then the
mechanism for more eﬃcient travel requires the delayed to pay the delay-
ers not to delay (a congestion prevention mechanism), or the delayed will
continue to suﬀer congestion. Alternatively, if everyone has the right to
freeﬂow (undelayed) travel, then the burden is on the delayers to compen-
sate the delayed (a congestion damages mechanism). We have demonstrat-
ed that the delayer pays principle – with compensation – can lead to eﬃcient
outcomes.
There are also several key philosophical questions that need to be ad-
dressed. These very much parallel the fundamental question of whether
people should be guaranteed equality of opportunity or equality of out-
come. Congestion externalities require two actors: the delayer and the
delayed. If both parties have equal opportunity to arrive, then one should
not compensate the other. However, if we want to guarantee an equal
outcome in terms of a combination of time and money, those who save
time should pay more money and those who spend more time should be
paid by those causing their delay.
Congestion pricing generates revenue that can substitute for convention-
al transportation ﬁnancing (such as the gas tax). Few transportation econ-
omists argue against substitution, as it makes sense as a demand manage-310 David Levinson · Peter Raﬀerty
ment measure. However, what to do with excess congestion pricing rev-
enue has been a hurdle for its adoption. In the absence of private roads,
this is a political problem. Suggestions range from the government keeping
the money, to building more roads, to providing transit, to compensating
the poor (redistributing the money by income class). There is a clear
alternative however that is fair, returning the excess congestion pricing
revenue to those who suﬀer congestion, in the form of cash or credits, with
a nominal base toll in place to stave oﬀ gaming of the system.
This paper presented the results of extending the delayer pays framework
to an experimental condition where 1200 drivers face a morning commute
bottleneck. It is clear that the marginal congestion cost had until recently
been incompletely interpreted, but now that it is fully identiﬁed, the
realization of marginal cost congestion pricing can be studied further.
There are substantial practical considerations that require further thought
regarding the shape of the long-range marginal cost toll when extended to
1200 or several thousand vehicles. It is reassuring to see that diverse
objectives can be met simultaneously. This is a key ﬁnding, with implica-
tions for further welfare and equity improvement. We have also shown that
correcting the congestion externality is tenable without making other
measures worse for drivers. This is another step closer to more eﬃcient
road ﬁnancing.
Further and more focused research should be made around those tolling
approaches that demonstrate meeting the objectives of accurately pricing
marginal congestion cost, reducing delay, balancing positive and negative
tolls, maintaining overall user cost, and improving social welfare, equity,
and consumer surplus.
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